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I INTRODUCTION 
 
“I don’t think they play at all fairly,” Alice began, in a rather 
complaining tone … “and they don’t seem to have any rules in 
particular; at least, if there are, nobody attends to them — and you've 
no idea how confusing it is…” 
Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland1 
 
spionage is a unique creature in international law. Practised throughout history, 
the world’s ‘second oldest profession’2 has long been acknowledged as a vital 
tool of statecraft, employed to achieve self-interested goals. Its occurrence is a ‘matter 
of practical reality’.3 Yet, surprisingly, given its prolific practice, espionage has 
largely eluded explicit international legal regulation. 
Presently, the only rules of international law that explicitly contemplate 
espionage arise in the context of conventional, ‘clear-cut’ wartime within the rubric of 
jus in bello. The law of armed conflict has developed fairly consistent principles that 
suggest belligerents are entitled to spy on each other but that captured spies are not 
immune from the operation of a violated state’s domestic law. However, international 
law appears agnostic towards espionage in times of peace.  
Conventional approaches to espionage developed in a security context that is 
unrecognisable today, reliant on traditional distinctions that are increasingly tested in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (Macmillan, 1865). 
2 Simon Chesterman, 'The Spy Who Came in from the Cold War' (2005) 27(4) Michigan Journal of 
International Law 1071, 1072. 
3 Robert Williams, '(Spy) Game Change: Cyber Networks, Intelligence Collection, and Covert Action' 
(2011) 79(4) George Washington Law Review 1162, 1163. 
E 
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the modern security environment. Importantly, the effects of this new security era on 
the architecture of the law of war and use of force arguably provide an opportunity to 
begin to develop international law’s recognition of peacetime espionage. 
In an attempt to bring greater synthesis between espionage, international law, 
international relations and the modern security environment, this paper will examine 
the need and the capability for international law to finally contemplate peacetime 
espionage as it is practised today.  Helping to rectify the paucity of existing literature, 
it will analyse how the legal framework surrounding peacetime espionage could be 
adapted to more appropriately reflect the modern context in which it is practised. At 
its heart, this paper is underscored by a central question: given the multiplicity of 
threats facing modern states, should peacetime espionage, in certain circumstances 
outside of a war context, be sanctioned under international law? 
This paper argues specifically that there should be, and indeed could be, an 
ancillary or incidental right to conduct peacetime espionage in certain contexts within 
the extended rubric of the right of self-defence. The intelligence produced by 
espionage on the location, status and imminence of shifting threats and armed attacks 
directly underpins the lawful invocation and effective exercise of any right of pre-
emptive or anticipatory self-defence. There is scant international literature proposing 
any such ‘ancillary’ or ‘incidental’ power in international law, which makes this 
proposal an innovative one. International law should not continue to be apathetic 
towards something so widely practised and so vital to the functioning of international 
relations, if it is to remain a legitimate authority regulating the interactions between 
states. Peacetime espionage needs to finally be brought in from the cold and be 
recognised, albeit in a limited way, by international law.  
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Due to the clandestine nature of espionage and the limited case law that exists, 
this is inherently a conceptual exploration, and is intended to provoke further 
academic discussion on the international lawfulness of espionage. Those writing 
about espionage face the problem that great volumes of relevant information are kept 
confidential. Moreover, because of their very nature, the few cases that do arise 
inherently involve failed acts of espionage. Thus, this paper will necessarily 
contemplate hypotheticals and a limited selection of case studies. Additionally, 
espionage gives rise to a multiplicity of related legal issues, most prominently 
concerning the treatment of captured spies and issues of state responsibility. Such 
questions inevitably colour any legal analysis of espionage. However, this paper must, 
for the sake of brevity, be confined to the issue of the legality of peacetime espionage 
as traditionally understood as a practice of states.  
This paper will proceed in the following parts. Part II will outline and analyse 
the traditional legal architecture and normative framework relating to wartime and 
peacetime espionage. Part III will explore how the modern security environment 
challenges traditional law of war architecture and conceptual distinctions of security 
and conflict. It will reveal that there is a lack of synthesis between modern peacetime 
espionage and international law’s traditional blindness to the practice. It will argue 
there is a need for international law to finally contemplate peacetime espionage. Part 
IV will seek to accommodate peacetime espionage within the rubric of self-defence 
by analysing the law and rationale behind extended doctrines of self-defence.   It will 
argue that, by logical extension, peacetime espionage is capable of being justified as 
an ancillary or incidental right to the right of self-defence. Part V will then provide a 
brief commentary on the utility of this argument and the possible prescriptions for the 
development of academic discussion and international law. 
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II THE TRADITIONAL LEGAL ARCHITECTURE OF ESPIONAGE 
A Key Terms and Scope 
The term ‘espionage’ is used narrowly in this paper, excluding tangential conduct 
such as sabotage, covert action, paramilitary activities and domestic surveillance. It is 
limited to the conventional conception of a human agent engaging in territorially-
intrusive intelligence collection in another state. Espionage is the ‘consciously 
deceitful collection of information, ordered by a government … accomplished by 
humans unauthorized by the target to do the collection’.4 Traditional definitions view 
espionage as essentially a state-to-state act targeting government or military assets,5 
although Parts III and IV will expose flaws in such a restriction. ‘Intelligence’ entails 
a broader concept and, for the purposes of this paper, is the product of the analysis of 
raw information collected through espionage.6 For the sake of brevity, this paper does 
not examine aspects of cyber espionage and other technologically-based practices of 
intelligence collection. 
B Legal Architecture 
There is no general norm or rule of international law that directly prohibits espionage. 
Indeed, the defining feature of espionage is its lack of legal control.7 Espionage — 
like the agents that practise it — operates in the shadows of international law, existing 
‘between the tectonic plates of legal systems’.8 Touching upon espionage somewhat 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Geoffrey Demarest, 'Espionage in International Law' (1996) 24(2) Denver Journal of International 
Law and Policy 321, 325-326. 
5 See, eg, Williams, above n 3, 1165; Craig Forcese, 'Spies Without Borders: International Law and 
Intelligence Collection' (2011) 5(1) Journal of National Security Law & Policy 179, 181. 
6 Forcese, above n 5, 181. 
7 Peyton Cooke, 'Bringing the Spies in from the Cold: Legal Cosmopolitanism and Intelligence Under 
the Laws of War' (2010) 44(3) University of San Francisco Law Review 601, 609. 
8 John Radsan, 'The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law' (2007) 28(3) Michigan 
Journal of International Law 595, 596. 
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indirectly, international rules affecting spying are aptly described as a ‘checkerboard 
of principles’.9 With no clear answer to the question of the legality of state espionage, 
international law has only ever contemplated espionage under the rubric of jus in 
bello. The resulting ‘murkiness’ has meant states have legislated domestically to 
prohibit and deter espionage within their borders.10  
A conventional, ‘clear-cut’ wartime-peacetime dichotomy was fundamental to 
the development of the international legal architecture of espionage. The legal and 
normative views on espionage developed in an era when states made formal 
declarations of war and faced each other on the battlefield in front lines. Historical 
instruments of international humanitarian law required a declaration of war before 
their terms commenced operation.11 Now, of course, an ‘armed conflict’ within the 
meaning of the Geneva Conventions12 arises in all cases of declared war, as well as 
armed conflicts between two state parties, even if the state of war is not recognised by 
one of them.13 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has 
found that ‘an armed conflict exists whenever there is resort to armed force between 
states or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Forcese, above n 5, 209. 
10 Williams, above n 3, 1165. 
11 See Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: 
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, opened for signature 18 October 1907, 
187 CTS 227 (entered into force 26 January 1910), section III (‘Hague Convention (IV)’). 
12 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces 
in the Field, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into force 21 October 1950); 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85, 135, 287 
(entered into force 21 October 1950); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135, 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950); 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature 
12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (‘Geneva Conventions’). 
13 See Jean Pictet, Commentary on the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1952) 32. 
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armed groups or between such groups within a state’.14 The triggering factor of the 
existence of an armed conflict animates the jus in bello rules relating to espionage. 
1 Espionage in Wartime 
The legality of espionage in wartime is fairly well established in international law, 
and the laws of war dealing with wartime espionage remain broadly consistent. 
Wartime espionage is a recognised ruse of warfare not prohibited by any treaty or 
customary norm. Territorially penetrative intelligence collection is permitted during 
armed conflict because of the ‘absence of any general obligation of belligerents to 
respect the territory or government of the enemy state’.15 
The early documents of international war law recognised the capacity of states 
to conduct wartime espionage. 16  They provided the foundation for the Hague 
Conventions, which, uniquely among instruments of international humanitarian law, 
explicitly identify espionage as a permissible ruse of war (while other instruments 
simply allow ruses of war generally, and carve out no exception for ruses relating to 
intelligence gathering).17 There is scholarly consensus that spying is consistent with 
the law of armed conflict.18 Numerous national military manuals and codes reflect the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14  Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Decision on the Defence Motion for the Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Case No 
IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995) [70] (Judges Cassese, Li, Deschenes, Abi-Saab, Sidhwa).  
15 Forcese, above n 5, 202. 
16 See The Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code) of 24 April 1863, art 
88, in D Schindler and J Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflict (Martinus Nijhoff Dordrecht, 3rd ed, 
1988) 3-23; Declaration of Brussels Concerning the Laws and Customs of War (adopted by the 
Conference of Brussels on 27 August 1874), in D Schindler and J Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflict 
(Martinus Nijhoff Dordrecht, 3rd ed, 1988) 22-34; Oxford Manual on the Laws of War on Land 
(adopted by the Institute of International Law on 9 September 1880), in D Schindler and J Toman, The 
Laws of Armed Conflict (Martinus Nijhoff Dordrecht, 3rd ed, 1988) 36-48. 
17 Dieter Fleck, 'Individual and State Responsibility For Intelligence Gathering' (2006) 28(3) Michigan 
Journal of International Law 687, 689. See Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
opened for signature 18 October 1907, 187 CTS 227 (entered into force 26 January 1910) art 24. 
18 See, eg, Major David Anderson, 'Spying in Violation of Article 10, UCMJ: The Offense and the 
Constitutionality of its Mandatory Death Penalty' (1990) 127 Military Law Review 1, 14. 
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position of the Hague Conventions that covert intelligence collection is legitimate 
during armed conflict.19 
Article 31 of the Hague Convention (IV) provides further evidence of the 
legitimacy of wartime espionage.  It states that soldier spies who are captured after re-
joining their forces incur no responsibility for their previous acts of espionage;20 they 
are afforded prisoner-of-war status akin to any other lawful combatant. Baxter claims 
that this provision indicates that, whilst threats of punishment are designed to deter 
spying, the fact that it is limited in operation proves that spying is a legitimate ruse of 
war. 21  Furthermore, under the Hague framework the fate of captured spies is 
determined by the domestic laws of a violated state. Whilst those who are caught 
engaging in acts of espionage are not afforded prisoner-of-war status and potentially 
face the death penalty,22 the severe punishments imposed on a spy ‘[do] not make his 
act, which international law authorizes and warrants, an illegitimate act’.23 Instead, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See, eg, J Maes, Droit Pénal et Disciplinaire Militaire et Droit de la Guerre, Deuxième Partie, Droit 
de la Guerre, D/1983/1187/029 (Belgian Ecole Royale Militaire, 1983) 21-22; Code of Military Justice 
1925, Republic of Chile; Code of Military Justice 1933, as amended in 1996, United Mexican States; 
Department of Defence, Law of Armed Conflict Manual, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4 
(Defence Publishing Service, 2006) 
<http://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/Documents/DoctrineLibrary/ADDP/ADDP06.4-
LawofArmedConflict.pdf> 7.18; The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels 
(Canada, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 2001) 
<http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/publications/oplaw-loiop/loac-ddca-2004/index-eng.asp> 320; Manuel de 
droit des conflits armés, Ministère de la Défense, Direction des Affaires Juridiques, Sous-Direction du 
droit international humanitaire et du droit européen (France, Bureau du droit des conflits armés, 2001) 
64; Rules of Warfare on the Battlefield, (Israel, Military Advocate-General’s Corps Command, IDF 
School of Military Law, 2nd ed, 2006). 
20  Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: 
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, opened for signature 18 October 1907, 
187 CTS 227 (entered into force 26 January 1910) art 31. 
21 Major Richard Baxter, 'So-Called 'Unprivileged Belligerency':  Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs' 
(1951) 28 British Year Book of International Law 323, 331. 
22 See, eg, Code of Military Justice 1925, Republic of Chile, arts 252-253; Code of Military Justice 
1933, as amended in 1996, United Mexican States, arts 206-207; Compendium “Law of Armed 
Conflicts”, Republic of Croatia (Ministry of Defence 1991) 65; Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, 
DM 112 (New Zealand Defence Force, Directorate of Legal Services, 1992) 506. 
23 Hayes McKinney, 'Spies and Traitors' (1918) 12(9) Illinois Law Review 591, 600. 
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such domestic punishments are justified by the danger which espionage poses to a 
state and the need for deterrence.24  
The Geneva Conventions did little to alter the Hague framework, merely 
extending safeguards for the treatment of captured spies.25 The Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions26 effectively reaffirmed the laws of war as outlined in the 
Hague and Geneva Conventions, 27  reinforcing that wartime spying is not 
internationally prohibited.28  Instead, domestic punishment acts as a deterrent to 
discourage the practice.  
What emerges from this state-centric framework is that in wartime states can 
send spies ‘without attracting opprobrium’. 29  The law mainly focuses upon 
determining who is, and who is not, a spy and whether or not they are entitled to 
prisoner-of-war status. Although spies in armed conflict do not violate the law of 
war,30 they receive no privileged status under the law of war. As Solis concludes, 
spies, ‘although engaging in acts not considered unlawful, are considered unlawful 
combatants’.31  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Baxter, above n 21, 329. See also Anderson, above n 18, 15. 
25 GN Barrie, 'Spying - an international perspective' (2008) 238(2) Journal of South African Law 238, 
246. 
26 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 
(entered into force 7 December 1979); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 
opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 (entered into force 7 December 1978). 
27 See, eg, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature 8 June 1977, 
1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1979) art 46(4). 
28 Yves Sandoz et al (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) 564. 
29 Cooke, above n 7, 618. 
30 Quincy Wright, ‘Espionage and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs’ in Roland J 
Stranger (ed), Essays on Espionage and International Law (Ohio State University Press, 1962) 3, 11. 
See also Sandoz et al, above n 28, 470. But see Ex parte Quirin, 317 US 1, (1942). 
31 Gary D Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War (Cambridge 
University Press, 2010) 430. 
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2 Espionage in Peacetime 
Peacetime espionage has traditionally held a far more equivocal position in 
international law. States have approached the question of peacetime espionage with a 
degree of ‘creative ambivalence’32 and ‘artful ambiguity’.33 This has left international 
law ‘remarkably oblivious’34 to its practice, providing no international doctrine and 
touching upon peacetime espionage only indirectly. Such blind spots are an 
undesirable feature for any system of law.35 
Peacetime espionage is neither censured nor condoned under international 
law; spies are neither prohibited nor protected. In the international sphere, it is dealt 
with politically, not legally. Peacetime espionage has ‘always been seen as an issue of 
domestic law, even though an international event is obviously involved’.36 Most 
domestic legal regimes perpetuate a double standard,37 where states which are the 
target of espionage missions punish captured spies for conduct in which they also 
engage. 
From a Realist38 perspective, much of the reason for this state ambivalence is 
that international law surrounding espionage is a result of international power politics. 
Law has historically been epiphenomenal to national interests in international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Forcese, above n 5, 210. 
33 Ibid 205. 
34 Radsan, above n 8, 602. 
35 See generally, Sir Daniel Bethlehem et al, 'Classification of Conflicts: The Way Forward' (Paper 
presented at the International Law Meeting, London, 1 October 2012  
<http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20Law/011012summ
ary.pdf> 2. 
36 Demarest, above n 4, 330. 
37 Eric Donnelly, 'The United States-China EP-3 Incident: Legality and Realpolitik' (2004) 9(1) Journal 
of Conflict & Security Law 25, 26. 
38 See generally, Tim Dunne and Brian C Schmidt, 'Realism' in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia 
Owens (eds), The Globalization of World Politics (Oxford University Press, 4th ed, 2008) 92-100. 
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security,39 and states resist entering into agreements that would restrict their freedom 
to act in their national interests.40 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has been reluctant to provide any 
opinion on the legality of espionage. It avoided a conclusive determination on the 
issue in Tehran Hostages.41 Iran did not present sufficient evidence for an opinion to 
be made on any alleged espionage. In any case, the Court noted the difficulty in 
discerning when lawful collection of information in the receiving state by diplomatic 
staff crosses into the realm of espionage or interference in internal affairs. 42 This, the 
Court reconciled, was best dealt with by the receiving state, who has at all times the 
right to deem diplomats persona non grata43 and expel them.44  
The reluctance for international law to directly address peacetime espionage 
has left scholars to debate and contest its normative and legal outlines. The question 
often asked is given this lack of recognition, is peacetime espionage illegal under 
international law? A survey of the relevant literature reveals that there is no direct 
answer and a deep division in the academic literature.45  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Veronica Raffo et al, 'Introduction: International law and international politics - old divides, new 
developments' in Thomas Biersteker et al (eds), International Law and International Relations: 
Bridging theory and practice (Routledge, 2007) 5.  
40 Ibid. See generally, Gillian Triggs, International Law: Contemporary Principles and Practices 
(LexisNexis Butterworths, 2nd ed, 2011) 13-14; Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: the 
Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2005); H L A Hart, 
The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, 1994). 
41 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran) [1980] ICJ 
Rep 3. 
42 Ibid 85; Forcese, above n 5, 201. 
43 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, opened for signature 18 April 1961, 500 UNTS 95 
(entered into force 24 April 1964) art 9; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, opened for 
signature 24 April 1963, 596 UNTS 261 (entered into force 19 March 1967) art 23. 
44 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran) [1980] ICJ 
Rep 3, 84. 
45 Forcese, above n 5, 202; Radsan, above n 8, 602. 
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(a)  The ‘Lotus Presumption’ 
The ‘Lotus presumption’ is a rule of international law that emerges from the landmark 
Lotus case,46 in which the ICJ held that states are free to engage in any conduct of 
their choosing in the absence of a rule of international law prohibiting such action.47 
This positivist approach 48 to international law grants states a wide measure of 
discretion in choosing how to conduct themselves on the international stage.49  
Accordingly, the lack of formal censure or treaty proscription might suggest 
that peacetime espionage is not to be presumed a breach of international law.50 
Numerous commentators point to widespread state practice and a lack of explicit 
proscription in order to reject the proposition that espionage is internationally 
wrongful.51 Some scholars are more indecisive and consider peacetime espionage to 
be neither clearly prohibited nor endorsed,52 of ‘doubtful compatibility with the 
requirements of law governing the peaceful intercourse of states’,53 or neither legal 
nor illegal.54 Importantly, though, these scholars fail to appreciate the operation of the 
‘Lotus presumption’, because in the absence of a rule rendering the conduct illegal, it 
is legal. That is the essence of the ‘Lotus presumption’. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 The Case of the S.S. Lotus (France v Turkey) (Judgment) [1927] PCIJ Reports (ser A) No 10 
(‘Lotus’). 
47 Ibid 18. See also Triggs, above n 40, 22, 27-28, 65, 121, 205, 206, 214. 
48 Triggs, above n 40, 22. 
49 See Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Clarendon 
Press, 1994) 32; M Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press, 6th ed, 2008) 212. 
50 See, eg, 'Submission of the Government of the Republic of El Salvador', Application for Revision of 
the Judgment of 11 September 1992 in the Case concerning the Land, Island and Martime Frontier 
Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening) (El Savador v Honduras) [2003] ICJ Pleadings 
C6/CR 2003/4, 1, 31(Mendelson QC); Michael Shebelskie, 'The Major Nicholson Incident and the 
Norms of Peacetime Espionage' (1986) 11(2) Yale Journal of International Law 521, 524. 
51 L Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise (Longmans, Green and Co., 8th ed, 1955); Demarest, 
above n 4, 347; Glen Sulmasy and John Yoo, 'Counterintuitive: Intelligence Operations and 
International Law' (2006) 28(3) Michigan Journal of International Law 625, 628. 
52 Christopher Baker, 'Tolerance of International Espionage: A Functional Approach' (2003) 19(5) 
American University International Law Review 1091, 1092. 
53 Baxter, above n 21, 329. 
54  See Radsan, above n 8, 605; Forcese, above n 5, 204; Daniel B Silver, 'Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence' in John Norton Moore and Robert F Turner (eds), National Security Law (Carolina 
Academic Press, 2nd ed, 2005) 935. See also Baker, above n 52, 1092. 
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(b)  Peacetime Espionage is a Violation of State Sovereignty and the Customary 
Norm of Non-Intervention 
The ‘Lotus presumption’ is the high-water mark of positivist international law,55 and 
although the ICJ has continued to apply it,56 it ‘no longer commands unqualified 
support’.57 Importantly, the framework of international law dictates the ‘scope and 
content of the independence of states’.58 Thus, even if it is not possible to point to a 
dedicated treaty or custom rule which directly prohibits peacetime espionage, there 
are strong grounds for considering this practice illegal under more sweeping rules of 
customary international law. Indeed, international law touches upon peacetime 
espionage indirectly through the norm of non-intervention. The attribute of 
‘sovereignty’ is thus a double-edged sword, where the benefits of the ‘Lotus 
presumption’ are subject to the sovereign rights of other states. Accordingly, the 
conflict between sovereignty and spying can provide the greatest insight into the 
legality of peacetime espionage.59 
The concept of state ‘sovereignty’ lies at the core of international law,60 
international order and stability. Indeed, the Lotus case also held that ‘the first and 
foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a state is that — failing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) (Judgment) [2002] 
ICJ Reports 3, 78 (Judges Higgins, Koojimans and Buergenthal). See also, Hugh Handeyside, 'The 
Lotus Principle in ICJ Jurisprudence: Was the Ship Ever Afloat?' (2007) 29(1) Michigan Journal of 
International Law 71, 94. 
56 See Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of 
Kosovo (Advisory Opinion) [2010] ICJ Reports 403, 26 [56]; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, 247; Military and Paramilitary Activities In and 
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 135. 
57 Triggs, above n 40, 206. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v 
Belgium) (Judgment) [2002] ICJ Reports 3, 63 [50]-[51] (Judges Higgins, Koojimans and 
Buergenthal); Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in 
respect of Kosovo (Advisory Opinion) [2010] ICJ Reports 403, 478 [1] (Judge Simma). 
58 Shaw, above n 49, 212. 
59 See, eg, Wright, above n 30, 3; Manuel Garcia-Mora, 'Treason, Sedition and Espionage as Political 
Offenses under the Law of Extradition' (1964) 26(1) University of Pittsburgh Law Review 65. 
60 Forcese, above n 5, 185. 
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existence of a permissive rule to the contrary — it may not exercise its power in any 
form in the territory of another state’.61 Sovereignty and territorial integrity were also 
recognised in Nicaragua62 as fundamental peacetime principles of international law.63 
The customary principle 64 of non-intervention was formally codified within the 
Charter of the United Nations in Articles 2(4) and 2(7). These articles reflect the 
emphasis on international system stability in international law and international 
relations.65 The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations66 provides authoritative interpretation of Article 2(4),67 reaffirming the 
inviolability of the personality of the state. Likely a reflection of customary law,68 this 
declaration has promoted the norm of peaceful cooperation and non-intervention.  
By its very nature, territorially-intrusive peacetime espionage is a violation of 
these articles and customary principles.69 Therefore, peacetime espionage may be 
deemed a violation of international law, which, while widely practised, remains a 
violation nonetheless. It can be recognised as unlawful and, according to Falk, it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 The Case of the S.S. Lotus (France v Turkey) (Judgment) [1927] PCIJ Reports (ser A) No 10, 18. 
62 Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA) (Merits) [1986] 
ICJ Rep 14. 
63 Ibid 6. 
64 Ibid 534 (Judge Jennings). 
65 David Armstrong, Theo Farrell and Helene Lambert, International Law and International Relations 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007) 121. 
66 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res 2625 (XXV), UN GAOR, 
25th sess, 1883rd plen mtg, Agenda Item 121, UN Doc A/8082 (24 October 1970). 
67 Armstrong, Farrell and Lambert, above n 65, 119. 
68 See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA) (Merits) 
[1986] ICJ Rep 14, 202; Forcese, above n 5, 198. 
69 Commander Roger Scott, 'Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and International Law' 
(1999) 46 Air Force Law Review 217, 219; Ingrid Delupis, 'Foreign Warships and Immunity for 
Espionage' (1984) 78(1) American Journal of International Law 53, 67; Wright above n 30; Garcia-
Mora, above n 59, 79-80; In re Flesche, Holland, Special Court of Cassation, Amsterdam, February 17, 
1949, [1949] Ann. Dig. 262, 272 (Case No. 87) (1955). 
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might most accurately be viewed as tolerated, but illegal.70 Indeed, Wright concludes 
it is a ‘consistently practised illegal activity’.71 
Thus, historically, the key determinant of the legality of espionage is that in 
peacetime, unlike in wartime, there is an obligation to respect the sovereignty and 
territorial inviolability of another state. These rules, which normally underpin inter-
state relations, do not operate in wartime.72 This is of central importance to the 
residual discussion in this paper because the conventional legitimacy of espionage is, 
therefore, founded upon clear-cut divisions of war and peace between states. However, 
these divisions may not be so readily drawn anymore. 
III THE MODERN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
The key factors in determining whether particular acts of espionage are lawful — the 
norm of non-intervention and respect for sovereignty — are decisively affected by 
whether a state of armed conflict or peace exists. But contemporary ‘peacetime’ is 
unrecognizable from that which occurred a century ago. Part III situates ‘peacetime’ 
espionage within the modern security context in which it occurs on an unprecedented 
scale. It argues that the traditional ambivalent approach of international law is no 
longer sustainable in an era where the wartime-peacetime dichotomy is imperilled by 
evolving forms and methods of conflict, and ‘peacetime’ is increasingly tumultuous 
and characterised by shifting threats from both state and non-state actors. Within this 
unstable environment, peacetime espionage is a vital tool of statecraft and is practiced 
on scales, by methods and against targets not contemplated by those framing the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Richard A. Falk, ‘Space Espionage and World Order: a Consideration of the Samos-Midas Program’ 
in Roland J Stranger (ed), Essays on Espionage and International Law (Ohio State University Press, 
1962) 45, 57. 
71 Wright, above n 30, 3. 
72 Armstrong, Farrell and Lambert, above n 65, 122. 
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conventional legal architecture relating to espionage a century ago. Accordingly, it is 
argued that international law’s current approach to peacetime espionage in times other 
than ‘clear-cut’ war is out-dated and that there is a need and an opportunity for it to 
finally comprehend and contemplate this practice as it occurs today. 
A The Fog of Peace: Challenges to the Traditional Security Environment and 
Law of War Architecture 
The basic assumptions of the Westphalian system are facing challenges. The once 
dominant Realist conception of international relations, which shaped the development 
of this state-centric international legal architecture surrounding wartime and 
peacetime espionage, is overly simplistic in an era of complex power geometries 
consisting of state and non-state actors. 73  International law needs to deal with 
evolving linkages and flows in the security complex it is intended to regulate. The 
modern security environment is vastly different to that which contextualised the 
formation of the minimalist legal architecture relating to espionage. It is characterised 
by constant states of alert towards fluid and shifting transnational security threats 
from states, failed and rogue states, and non-state actors. Non-traditional threats that 
include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and biological weapons, 
international terrorism and international criminal networks undermine old security 
paradigms and promote an increasingly ‘fluid mass of anarchy’. 74  Indeed, the 
increased capacity of non-state actors to carry out destructive acts 75  like the 
September 11, 2001 attacks, the 2004 Madrid train bombings, the 2002 and 2005 Bali 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 See generally, Ulrich Brand, 'Order and Regulation: Global Governance as a Hegemonic Discourse 
of International Politics?' (2005) 12(1) Review of International Political Economy 155, 160; R J Holton, 
Global Networks (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 194. 
74 Harvey Rishikof and Patrick Bratton, '11/9/11: The Brave New World Order: Peace Through Law - 
Beyond Power Politics or Peace Through Empire - Rationale Strategy and Reasonable Policy' (2005) 
50(3) Villanova Law Review 655, 655. 
75  Abraham D. Sofaer, 'On the Necessity of Pre-Emption' (2003) 14(2) European Journal of 
International Law 209, 225. 
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bombings, and the 2005 London bombings challenges ‘the traditional modus operandi 
of states, in which state sovereignty is supreme and threats are expected to derive 
from other states, not from sub-state actors’.76 
This ‘brave new world’77 should inform our understanding of international law 
and institutions, especially as they relate to international security. In contrast to the 
Cold War, the ‘War on Terror’ is characterised by asymmetric conflict and lacks a 
rigid balance of power between sovereign equals. 78  With the days of formal 
declarations of war between states are largely over, the new security terrain is 
constituted by escalating degrees of cross-border activity, and the involvement of both 
third states and non-state actors.79 International Law, jus ad bellum and jus in bello 
must now govern an ‘increasingly complex and sophisticated threat-based 
environment’.80  
This new era precipitates challenges to legal characterisations of armed 
conflict and what constitutes an event that triggers the application of jus in bello. 
Expansive constructions of armed conflict such as concepts of transnational-armed 
conflict blur the boundaries between traditional wartime and peacetime notions of 
international and internal armed conflict.81 For example, the United States Supreme 
Court’s 2006 decision in Hamdan v Rumsfeld82 held that the term ‘non-international 
armed conflict’ in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions should extend 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Curtis A Ward, 'Commentary: Convergence of International Law and International Relations in 
Combating International Terrorism' in Thomas Biersteker et al (eds), International Law and 
International Relations: Bridging theory and practice (Routledge, 2007) 133. 
77 Rishikof and Bratton, above n 74, 655. 
78 Chesterman, above n 2, 1097. 
79 Elisabeth Holland, 'The Qualification Framework of International Humanitarian Law: Too Rigid to 
Accommodate Contemporary Conflict' (2011) 34(1) Suffolk Transnational Law Review 145, 146. 
80 Demarest, above n 4, 342. 
81 Geoffrey S Corn, 'Self-defence Targeting: Blurring the Line between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus 
in Bello' (2011) 88(1) International Law Studies Series US Naval War College 57, 61. See generally, 
Peter Andreas, 'Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-first Century' (2003) 28(2) 
International Security 78. 
82 548 U.S. 557, (2006). 
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beyond mere internal armed conflicts to any armed conflict which does not amount to 
international within the terms of Common Article 2. 83  Consequently, cardinal 
principles of international law, including of non-intervention in the affairs of other 
states, must be upheld in an era of cross-border and transnational-armed conflicts that 
transcend territorial boundaries with ease.  
The sanctity of peacetime is being disrupted, as states’ conduct casts doubt on 
historical rules regarding when the use of force against both state and non-state actors 
will be considered an unlawful violation of the norm of non-intervention. For example, 
states are extending the rubric of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations to pre-empt threats to their national security through military strikes 
on state and non-state actors. The progressive shadow war of drone strikes across 
Yemen and Northern Pakistan targeting individuals like Anwar al-Awlaki in 
September 201184 exemplifies these evolving approaches to security and conflict. 
Consequently, the modern dynamics of combating terrorism are unsettling for 
conventional war law classifications. From such action the traditional 
compartmentalization of jus ad bellum and jus in bello is being tested by measures of 
self-defence that involve targeted and isolated strikes.85 There are also new actors 
involved in conflict zones, including private military contractors and multinational 
corporations,86 as well as new dimensions of warfare in the cyber realm.87 The grey 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Ibid 629-632 (Justice Stevens). 
84 See Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt and Robert F. Worth, 'Two-Year Manhunt Led to Killing of Awlaki 
in Yemen', The New York Times (Online), 30 September 2011 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-is-killed-in-
yemen.html?ref=anwaralawlaki&_r=0>; Mark Mazzetti, Charlie Savage and Scott Shane, 'How a U.S. 
Citizen Came to Be in America's Cross Hairs', The New York Times (Online), 9 March 2013 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-a-us-citizen-in-americas-
cross-hairs.html?hp>. 
85 See, eg, Corn, above n 81, 61. 
86  See generally, Francesco Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti, War by Contract: Human Rights, 
Humanitarian Law, and Private Contractors (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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zone of peacetime and the new paradigm of international security heralded by the 
‘War on Terror’ make the Hague and Geneva Conventions,88 as well as the Charter of 
the United Nations, appear increasingly old-fashioned and out-of-touch in certain 
aspects of international relations.  
Accordingly, this framework of laws has been subject to focused criticism of 
its suitability to govern modern conflict. 89  As Bowman contends, ‘mechanical 
application of venerable principles to modern situations can lead to anomalous 
conclusions’. 90  Indeed, today states resort to methods that are not expressly 
considered by the Charter of the United Nations such as pre-emptive self-defence, 
humanitarian intervention,91 and drone and cyber warfare. The existing laws of war 
face increasing pressure as the nature of conflict and threats change, and the methods 
used to respond adapt.92  
The strain on international law has already provided opportunities for many 
areas of international law relating to conflict, security and war to evolve in 
recognition of these continuing changes. The Protocols Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions exemplify this evolution, building upon Common Article 3 of the 
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Technically-Based Espionage Threat' (2006) 12(3) Roger Williams University Law Review 832. 
88 Rishikof and Bratton, above n 74, 675. 
89  See, eg, Claus Kreß, 'Some Reflections on the International Legal Framework Governing 
Transnational Armed Conflicts' (2010) 15(2) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 245; Michael Wood, 
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Yearbook of International Law 141; Fernando R Teson, 'Kosovo: A Powerful Precedent for the 
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Geneva Conventions to extend the frame of international armed conflict,93 and expand 
the laws of war and protections of victims in non-international armed conflicts.94 
Developments relating to guerrilla fighters95 and private security contractors96 are 
further examples. Indeed, international laws concerning jus ad bellum and jus in bello 
are being stretched and strained in various capacities as traditional doctrines such as 
the right of self-defence are tested. In contrast, traditional peacetime espionage has 
been left undisturbed. 
As illustrated, modern-day espionage is practiced in a vastly different strategic 
security context to that in which the Charter of the United Nations and the Hague and 
Geneva Conventions were drafted. The once clear-cut wartime-peacetime division 
that underpins the conventional legal framework around espionage is becoming 
increasingly tenuous.97 
B Situating Espionage Within this Modern Peacetime Environment 
Of course, the utility of intelligence in foreign policy decision-making is axiomatic.98 
Espionage produces intelligence, which feeds risk assessments formulated to guide 
security decisions. Importantly, this modern security terrain is ‘ripe for continued 	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94 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 
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related to Operations of Private Military and Security companies during Armed Conflict, opened for 
signature 17 September 2008, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf>. See 
also Peter Maurer, Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations, Letter to the 
Secretary-General, United Nations, annex, UN Doc A/63/4670S/2008/636 (6 October 2008). 
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reliance on espionage’99 to develop information about state and non-state actors and 
the various threats they pose. States are ‘acutely aware that today’s pivotal battlefield 
is an informational one’. 100  Intelligence activities are being conducted on 
unprecedented scales and through evolving technologies well beyond those once 
envisaged. In an era plagued by a multiplicity of threats, in which rogue states do not 
participate in arms control efforts and other measures designed to increase confidence 
and stability, and in which the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and the risk of ‘loose nukes’ abound, there is a pressing need for adequate 
intelligence.101 This is a need served in part by espionage. 
Intelligence is one of states’ first lines of defence. Indeed, spying is 
‘potentially one of the most effective weapons’102 in this environment of shifting and 
fluid security threats.103 Human agents remain an essential part of the international spy 
game, as drones and computers cannot detect the motives, intentions and mindsets of 
non-state actors as readily as humans can. This applies equally to targeted states by 
helping to discern between mere rhetoric and the actual intention of political leaders. 
Espionage is still frequently a state-to-state act. For example, in 2013 a Dutch 
court ruled that a former foreign ministry worker was a Russian spy, providing secret 
information relating to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s practices regarding 
Afghanistan and Libya. 104  In 2012, Canadian sub-lieutenant Jeffry Delisle was 
sentenced to 20 years gaol for acting as a Russian spy, passing official secrets to the 	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102 John Schindler, 'Defeating the Sixth Column: Intelligence and Strategy in the War on Islamist 
Terrorism' (2005) 49(4) Orbis 695, 709. 
103 Baker, above n 52, 1093. 
104  See Dutch ministry worker jailed for spying (23 April 2013) euronews 
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Russian military via USB flash drive.105 In 2011, two Thai nationals were sentenced to 
gaol in Cambodia for espionage.106  In 2010, the United States uncovered a 10-person 
Russian sleeper cell spy ring.107 In the last decade, Ana Montes and Marta Velazquez 
were found to have been spying in the United States Defense Intelligence Agency on 
behalf of Cuba.108 
However, traditional definitions and the international legal architecture 
relating to espionage arguably do not account for the evolution of espionage as a 
practice of states in modern world politics. The initial conventions and formulations 
touching upon espionage pre-dated the creation of many foreign intelligence agencies. 
Peacetime espionage is predominately carried out not by members of the armed forces 
as contemplated by the Hague Conventions, but rather by individuals in government 
agencies like China’s Ministry of State Security, the Australian Secret Intelligence 
Service or Israel’s Mossad. For example, diplomatic spies under the guidance of the 
South Korean National Intelligence Service were recently uncovered in 2011 in 
Australia’s capital to be cultivating public officials to pass secret information.109  
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109 Philip Dorling, 'Spies caught in Canberra', National Times, The Sydney Morning Herald (Online), 2 
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Further, there are new targets of peacetime espionage in the form of non-state 
actors operating within the territory of sovereign states. States increasingly seek 
intelligence not necessarily about other states, their governments or military, but 
rather about non-state actors existing within another state’s territory. For example, in 
the 1990s, Moroccan spy Omar Nasiri infiltrated the al-Qaeda Khalden training camp 
in Afghanistan on behalf of European counter-terrorism agencies such as France’s 
Directorate-General for External Security.110 In 2012, the United States sponsored a 
Yemeni spy to gather information on al-Qaeda affiliates, leading to the assassination 
of Adnan Al-Qadhi by drone strike.111 In 2011, 5 Pakistani clandestine informants for 
the Central Intelligence Agency were arrested for providing information and 
operational support for the surveillance and eventual raid of the bin Laden compound 
in Abbottabad, Pakistan.112 Additionally, Britain’s MI5 is well known to have been 
conducting intelligence operations towards Irish Republican Army operatives 
throughout Europe for many decades. 113  When territorially-intrusive espionage 
operations target non-state actors, including individuals within another state’s 
territory, various questions arise around the suitability of traditional definitions of 
espionage and conventional understandings of it being a purely inter-state practice.  
Additionally, espionage is increasingly being conducted for relatively novel 
purposes, beyond national security or merely for keeping a watchful eye. For example, 	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in 2013, British and American agents have been employed amongst the Syrian 
conflict to ascertain the use of chemical weapons.114 These intelligence-gathering 
missions appeared to be for humanitarian purposes, to determine whether such 
weapons have been used against civilians and rebels, and to inform decision-making 
processes towards aiding the rebels or intervening in some way for the protection of 
civilians. It has also been revealed in the recent ‘Prisoner X’ controversy surrounding 
the death of Mossad agent Ben Zygier that the intelligence operation which was 
sabotaged by Zygier was directed primarily towards the repatriation of the remains of 
three missing Israeli soldiers in Lebanon, and not towards undermining Hezbollah.115 
What do these general trends mean for questions around the legality of 
espionage in all times other than clear-cut, state-centric wartime? Writing in 1996, 
Demarest argued that ‘the development of international legal principles regarding 
peacetime espionage has lagged behind changes in international intelligence gathering 
norms and practices’.116 This is an accurate evaluation given the profound changes in 
the international intelligence community and the growth in espionage.117 Even in 1972 
it was Edmondson’s opinion that ‘antiquated rules remain rigid’ and that the 
venerable Hague Conventions ‘serve to crystallize the law of espionage in its 
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outmoded form’.118 This commentary remains apposite to this day because the legal 
approaches to espionage continue to be tied to ‘archaic’ theoretical foundations.119 
Consequently, the traditional ‘either/or’ triggering paradigm of traditional 
international laws of war and espionage is insufficient today.120 It is important to be 
pragmatic in addressing these shortcomings if international law, specifically relating 
to ‘peacetime’ espionage, is to remain meaningful into the future. The legitimacy and 
authority of international law is arguably undermined when it does not contemplate a 
practice so prolific and so vital to modern international security. 
‘Peacetime’ espionage must therefore be brought in from the cold and finally 
be proactively contemplated by international law in some way. As this security 
context continues to evolve, the traditional rationale for the differing legality of 
spying in wartime and peacetime identified in Part II faces growing pressure and 
warrants further academic treatment. The sanctity of the principle of non-intervention, 
which indirectly makes espionage a violation of international law in times other than 
clear-cut war, must withstand a barrage of conflicting state and non-state practice. 
Additionally, because the traditional war and peace distinction is under strain, and the 
nature of peacetime is increasingly tumultuous and uncertain, the ambivalence and 
indirect treatment of contemporary peacetime espionage under international law is 
becoming inadequate. 
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IV A RIGHT OF ‘INTELLIGENT SELF-DEFENCE’ 
The nature of modern peacetime suggests there is an opportunity and a need to begin 
to recognise and contemplate espionage in times other than clear-cut war. If self-
defence and its extended doctrines are accepted as legitimate exceptions to the long-
standing norm of non-intervention and the prohibition on the use of force, then 
‘peacetime’ espionage and its inherent territorial violation might find solace within 
the extended rubric of self-defence and jus ad bellum. Accepting the extended 
doctrines of self-defence are legitimate, Part IV will argue that peacetime espionage 
may be justified in certain contexts as an incidental or ancillary right to the right of 
self-defence, which could consequently help to build a more intelligent self-defence 
doctrine.   
A The Right of Self-Defence 
Under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, each member state is accorded 
the inherent right of self-defence if an armed attack occurs against it. This rule is a 
fundamental tenet of international law and security, and is one of a few exceptions to 
the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) and the customary principles of non-
intervention and territorial inviolability. International system stability,121 survival122 
and self-preservation123 are the fundamental rationales behind the right of self-defence.  
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This doctrine has traditionally been interpreted narrowly and strictly;124 the 
right to act in self-defence is not triggered until an armed attack occurs, which is a 
high threshold. Additionally, the invocation and exercise of the right of self-defence is 
informed and governed by ‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’, two cardinal principles of 
customary law on the use of force.125 Necessity is generally understood as meaning no 
alternative response is possible. Proportionality considers the degree, duration and 
target of the response.126 An example of where the right of self-defence was explicitly 
upheld by the United Nations Security Council was the 1990 Iraq/Kuwait conflict.127 
Restrictionists argue that Article 51 supersedes any previous customary principles on 
the right of self-defence,128 limiting the right to the article’s simple formulation. 
B Extending the Right of Self-Defence 
The scope of Article 51 has been gradually challenged in recent decades as some 
states and scholars have called for a more expansive interpretation to the right of self-
defence. Events such as 9/11 and the 2003 Iraq War have incited debates about the 
desirability of an enlarged right of self-defence, which permits pre-emptive and 
anticipatory defensive action. 129  For example, the 2002 United States National 
Security Strategy provided that ‘[t]o forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our 
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adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively’.130 Prior to the 
2003 Iraq invasion former President Bush argued that to stick to a rigid interpretation 
would be ‘suicide’ in a world of terrorism and nuclear proliferation. 131 From a similar 
standpoint, Russian President Vladimir Putin and former Prime Minister of Australia 
John Howard have previously defended the right strike pre-emptively.132 Rationales 
underlying these modern security strategies rest upon the change in the calculus of 
self-defence from the evolving nature of modern conflict and the enhanced capacity 
of actors to rapidly employ devastating force, outlined in Part III. 
It is important for self-defence and the rationale underpinning it to remain 
meaningful in the modern security environment. For this reason, Chainoglou has 
noted that state practice and a number of academics indeed favour ‘a more lax 
interpretation of the right of self-defence’.133 The debated scope of self-defence may 
be viewed on a horizontal scale; ‘alongside the threat that matures until it turns into an 
armed attack, the right of self-defence builds up from preventive, to pre-emptive, to 
anticipatory, to actual self-defence against an already occurring attack’.134 Preventive 
self-defence, entailing the use of force even where there is no reason to believe an 
attack is imminent,135 receives little scholarly support and arguably stretches self-
defence too far to be legitimate. 136  Pre-emptive measures concentrate on the 
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developing capabilities of threatening actors.137  Anticipatory measures use force 
against an actor that ‘actively and imminently threatens with an armed attack’.138  
International jurisprudence suggests that there is a customary right of self-
defence outside of Article 51,139 although the scope of this right is uncertain. The 
growing state support for pre-emptive self-defence in the aftermath of the recent Iraq 
War supports a developing customary rule permitting such conduct.140 Other examples 
of state practice of pre-emptive self-defence include Israel’s pre-emptive air strike 
against the Egyptian air force in 1967 and the Six-Day War; Israel’s attack on the 
Iraqi Osirak nuclear facility in 1981;141 Israel’s firing of missiles into Syria, most 
recently in May 2013 targeting missiles Israel believed were destined for 
Hezbollah;142 and the United States’ pre-emptive attack upon a pharmaceutical plant 
in Sudan in 1998.  Furthermore, both the United States and Japan have claimed that 
they would take pre-emptive action against North Korea if they feared attack,143 and 
North Korea has responded with similar rhetoric.144 Rationales behind pre-emption are 
based not just on temporal imminence, but also the degree of potential harm and the 
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capability and probability of an attack.145 Nonetheless, this is admittedly a far more 
debated model of self-defence.146  
Though it is still an unsettled area of international law, authority to engage in 
anticipatory measures is more readily implied ‘where justified by the certain existence 
of an imminent threat of an attack’.147 Bowett argues that international law has 
‘always recognised an “anticipatory” right of self-defence’.148 The ‘inherent’ right of 
self-defence can be traced to the Caroline incident where the right was argued in 
circumstances when the necessity is ‘instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of 
means, and no moment for deliberation’.149 This recognises that anticipatory self-
defence may have a place within international law in such circumstances.150 It 
suggests that an ‘armed attack’ can be imminent even if it does not materialise.151 
The ICJ has avoided pronouncements on the limits of the right of self-defence 
where it is not central to its conclusion.152 In its Advisory Opinion in Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,153 the ICJ did not rule out the possibility of 
anticipatory self-defence. 154  It was also fairly ambivalent on its legality in 
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Nicaragua,155 largely leaving the issue open.156 In his dissenting opinion, Judge 
Schwebel, supporting an expanded reading of self-defence, said:  
I do not agree with a construction of the United Nations Charter 
which would read article 51 as if it were worded: 'Nothing in the 
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if, and only if, an armed attack occurs'. I do 
not agree that the terms or intent of article 51 eliminate the right of 
self-defence under customary international law, or confine its entire 
scope to the express terms of article 51.157 
Despite the ICJ’s reluctance to confirm or deny a right of anticipatory self-defence, 
the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel has identified that the right of anticipatory 
self-defence is part of the right of self-defence, and that the concept of ‘armed attack’ 
includes ‘imminent attack’.158 Even in 1958, Bowett believed that ‘[n]o state can be 
expected to await an initial attack which, in the present state of armaments, may well 
destroy the state’s capacity for further resistance and so jeopardize its very 
existence’.159 Indeed, strict interpretations of Article 51 requiring an armed attack 
become ‘simply unworkable’ in this modern security environment,160 and fail to 
reflect the nature of modern threats. Consequently, Chaingolou argues for a 
reconceptualization of the right of self-defence to ensure it continues to adequately 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA) (Merits) [1986] 
ICJ Rep 14. 
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157 Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA) (Merits) [1986] 
ICJ Rep 14, 347 (Judge Schwebel) (emphasis added). 
158 Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 'A More Secure World: 
Our Shared Responsibility' (United Nations, 2004) <http://www.un.org/secureworld/report3.pdf> 63. 
See also Niaz A Shah, 'Self-defence, Anticipatory Self-defence and Pre-emption: International Law's 
Response to Terrorism' (2007) 12(1) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 95, 111; Chainoglou, above n 
133, 72. 
159 D W Bowett, Self-defence in International Law (Manchester University Press, 1958) 191. 
160 Triggs, above n 40, 618. 
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address contemporary threats.161 This reflects much of the rationale for these extended 
doctrines of self-defence.  
For these reasons, the championed ‘War on Terror’ challenges narrow 
interpretations of Article 51, as both non-state actors and the states that harbour them 
become targets of measures of self-defence that occur outside of the traditional 
context of a response to an armed attack by a state which has already materialised. 
Accordingly, the United Nations Security Council recognised in Resolutions 1368162 
and 1373 163  the inherent right of self-defence against non-state actors. 164  Such 
measures are warranted where the state in whose territory the non-state actor is 
planning or preparing attacks is unwilling or unable to take the necessary action to 
prevent further acts of terror emanating from within its borders,165 an obligation 
identified by the ICJ back in the 1949 Corfu Channel case.166 Additionally, Judges 
Buergenthal and Higgins in the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion in Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory167 observed that nothing 
in the text of Article 51 limits the availability of self-defence only to situations where 
the armed attack is made by a state.168 Additionally, Triggs argues that Security 
Council resolutions following 9/11 also impliedly justify intervention against a state 
that supports or harbours non-state actors who have carried out a terrorist attack, and 
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that there is a ‘right to ‘pre-emptive’ action to prevent future attacks’.169 This view 
attracts scholarly support.170  
The right of self-defence is an evolving one that will arguably adapt in order 
to accommodate security threats in different contexts. The preceding analysis outlines 
that extended self-defence doctrines might be invoked pre-emptively or anticipatorily 
against both state and non-state actors. Notwithstanding the contested legality of these 
extended forms, a broader reading of self-defence is arguably justified given its 
importance in this modern security environment. Accordingly, the following analysis 
proceeds on the assumptions that both pre-emptive and anticipatory measures are 
lawful exercises of self-defence, or that that is the direction in which international law 
is ineluctably heading. 
C A Right to Conduct Espionage Incidental or Ancillary to the Right of Self-
Defence 
If pre-emptive and anticipatory measures are accepted as legitimate exercises of self-
defence, then, by logical extension, the necessary processes to gather the information 
to decide on the nature and imminence of any threat are arguably equally permissible. 
In this way, could some forms of peacetime espionage be considered internationally 
lawful, as exceptions to the norm of non-intervention, as incidental or ancillary parts 
of the doctrine of self-defence? Taking a realistic perspective of the utility of 
espionage, should it be a legitimate action within the framework of jus ad bellum in 
certain contexts outside of clear-cut war? If so, what legal or practical implications 
might flow from such an argument? 
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Addressing these questions requires a lateral shift in the frame of reference for 
espionage from jus in bello towards jus ad bellum. A total reconceptualization of the 
function and utility of peacetime espionage in international law and international 
relations properly places peacetime espionage into the realm of jus ad bellum under 
the extended rubric of the right of self-defence. But, as outlined, espionage has 
traditionally been contemplated by international law only within jus in bello as a ruse 
of warfare. Yet as the modern security environment actually increases the need for 
espionage, resulting in unprecedented scales of practice, it is important to shift 
conceptually from debating espionage only as a legitimate or illegitimate means of 
warfare to a practice relating to whether authority exists for the use of force. Only 
then may peacetime espionage be adequately handled by international law. Indeed, 
intelligence gleaned from espionage can go to the very premise of jus ad bellum in 
determining when the use of force is warranted. Only informed states may accurately 
make this determination. 
1 Should a Right to Conduct Espionage Incidental or Ancillary to the Right of 
Self-Defence Develop? 
This section contends that by situating espionage within the self-defence rubric, it can, 
in certain contexts, be a justified violation of the principle of non-intervention, where 
it is specifically directed towards the invocation of the right of pre-emptive or 
anticipatory self-defence. When carried out to gather intelligence on the planning, 
organisation and logistics that precede an armed attack, espionage is a practice 
ancillary to the lawful exercise of the right of self-defence. 
Espionage conducted with the purpose of informing the lawful invocation and 
effective exercise of the extended right of self-defence should be justified as a lawful 
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practice incidental to that parent right. To keep the right of self-defence relevant in the 
modern international system, espionage (at least in some forms) should be considered 
necessary and appropriate to effectuate the exercise of the right of pre-emptive and 
anticipatory self-defence. This is because it would lead to more legitimate invocations 
of self-defence and more effective defensive measures. A more ‘forgiving standard 
for spying in self-defence’ is warranted if the crucial right to self-defence is to remain 
meaningful into the future.171 This would arguably be a reasonable and appropriate 
means of furthering the object of the right of self-defence. Although he does not fully 
develop the point, Scott provides in-principle (if cursory) support for this proposition, 
stating that espionage ‘in the territory of other nations that present clear, articulable 
threats based on their past behaviour, capabilities and expressions of intent, may be 
justified as a practise essential to the right to self-defence’.172 
To avoid doubt, this argument does not propose a blanket justification for all 
types of espionage and for all purposes. Unlike in wartime, only those incidents that 
can be brought within the purpose of informing the legitimate invocation and exercise 
of the right of self-defence should be justified. Spying for mere general purposes, like 
the South Korean diplomatic spies uncovered in 2011 in Australia to be engaging in 
economic espionage,173 would not likely fall within the rubric of extended self-
defence and thus do not attract the same justifications. Admittedly, this may be a 
particularly hard line to draw in practice, but for the purposes of conceptual 
discussion and the cogency of argument it is an important one. 
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As they are the two elements that govern and regulate the exercise of the right 
of self-defence,174 necessity and proportionality should underpin any argument to 
incidentally accommodate espionage within the self-defence rubric. 
(a) Espionage Leads to a More Informed Invocation of the Right of Self-
Defence by Helping to Assess ‘Necessity’ 
Espionage is an essential practice to inform the constitutive element of ‘necessity’ of 
the law of extended self-defence. The only way a state can properly exercise the right 
of pre-emptive or anticipatory self-defence is if it has a high degree of certainty 
surrounding the threat it is combatting. Indeed, a key problem with the exercise of the 
right of self-defence and its extended forms is that the legitimacy of pre-emptive or 
anticipatory defensive action relies heavily on the quality of the intelligence that 
inspires the use of force.175 Espionage can provide the necessary evidence for when 
the authority to employ military force may be granted under the right of self-
defence,176 and to help avoid miscalculations and uncertainty. It is thus logical to 
extend the rubric of self-defence to contemplate peacetime espionage.  
How are states to know of a threat, and whether it justifies the use of force, 
without actionable intelligence? How do states determine the status of the threat, the 
intent and capability of the actor, and the necessary reaction time to assess whether to 
take action in self-defence pre-emptively, anticipatorily, or otherwise? These 
questions must be examined ‘in the light of real and substantial evidence’;177 evidence 
partly collected by espionage. A thorough understanding of the rationale behind self-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226; Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) [2005] ICJ Rep 
2005 168. 
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defence and its extended doctrines helps to logically argue that actionable information 
is necessary for their legitimate invocation. Measures of anticipatory or pre-emptive 
self-defence are only legitimate when supported by cogent and accurate evidence of a 
developing or imminent attack, of the actor likely to perpetrate it, and of the 
likelihood of a responsive use of force succeeding in eliminating the threat.178  
In an era where intention is collapsed into capacity, 179  threats can be 
materialised in a very short time frame and without warning. Consequently, 
Chaingolou proposes that any right of extended self-defence is dependent upon the 
timing, probability and degree of a future attack,180 factors which cannot adequately 
be assessed without vital intelligence gleaned from espionage. Accordingly, by 
helping to identify and evaluate the imminence of a threat, Scott notes that the ‘need 
for intelligence to support the effective exercise of the right of anticipatory self-
defence is greater in today’s friction-filled, multipolar world than it has ever been 
before’.181 Furthermore, Zedalis argues that both the capacity and the intention of an 
adversary are of central importance if remote threats are to be accepted as ‘capable of 
prompting early defensive action’. 182 Evidence collected from espionage can go 
directly towards supporting an accurate determination of these two elements, and thus 
the cornerstone element of necessity of use of force in self-defence. 
(b) Espionage Would Lead to a More Efficient and ‘Proportionate’ Exercise of
 the Right of Self-Defence 
Justifying peacetime espionage would lead to more efficient and proportionate acts of 
self-defence. Accepting that states are allowed to anticipatorily or pre-emptively 	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strike in self-defence, or even strike in retaliation, it is imperative that they have 
information about their adversary, state or non-state, which enables their strike to be 
proportionate, accurate and effective. 
Today, the shrinking time frame in which self-defence measures may be 
carried out, and the risk of miscalculating intention and misconceiving facts, suggest 
that espionage should be an ancillary right to the right of self-defence and its extended 
forms. Espionage may provide the most accurate information to perform adequate 
calculations and assessments in a time-poor security context. In contrast to states, 
non-state actors cannot be trusted to behave rationally, resulting in uncertainty and 
unpredictability.183 There is, therefore, high value attached to accurate information 
gleaned through espionage to accurately and efficiently determine intention and 
capability, and thus the proportion of response required. Inaccurate perceptions of the 
status of a particular threat may lead to avoidable degrees of conflict and actions that 
are out of proportion, in terms of intensity and duration, to what is required. With 
imperfect information, states may overreact leading to unacceptable collateral damage 
and international opprobrium, or equally dangerously they may underreact leading to 
a successful state or non-state attack that has the potential to inflict catastrophic 
damage. Ultimately, this would help to make defensive measures more proportionate 
and effective. Indeed, heavily criticised uses of force, such as the 2003 Iraq 
invasion, 184  could become more internationally palatable if their necessity and 
proportionality are more apparent, and they could receive more legitimacy if better 
informed by stronger intelligence garnered from espionage. 	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Consistent with this argument, the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel 
proposed basic criteria to determine the legitimacy of self-defence measures, 
including the seriousness of the threat, the proportionality of the proposed act to the 
threat, and whether there is a high chance of the military action taken being 
successful.185 These criteria cannot be adequately assessed without proper intelligence, 
and therefore following the opinion of the High Level Panel, neither can the right of 
self-defence be legitimately and proportionately exercised. When directed towards 
collecting the requisite intelligence for such determinations, espionage is a necessary 
action to give meaning and effect to the right of self-defence. Gray also argues that ‘it 
is difficult, if not impossible, to employ these central criteria [of necessity and 
proportionality] in the absence of detailed evidence about a specific threatened 
attack’.186 Therefore, there should be an ancillary right to conduct espionage, as it 
would logically support a more legitimate exercise of the right of self-defence.  
2 Could an Incidental or Ancillary Right Develop? 
Whether an incidental or ancillary right could develop depends upon whether it is a 
workable concept in international law, and also the ease in which international law 
and international relations can move from tolerance to justification of peacetime 
espionage today. 
(a) Is an ‘Incidental’ or ‘Ancillary’ Right a Workable Concept in International 
Law? 
The concept of an ‘incidental’ or ‘ancillary’ right appears a relatively novel one in 
international law. Locating such incidental powers may require identifying a ‘general 
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principle of law’, which is a source of international law.187 Taking guidance from the 
constitutional law doctrine of ‘implied incidental powers’, it is a constitutional 
principle that if a government has constitutional power to legislate towards one object, 
then if it needs also to legislate towards something incidental to that in order to 
effectuate the primary objective, it should be allowed to do so.188 Further insight into 
such a concept might be taken from human rights jurisprudence relating to the right to 
life.  For example, the Supreme Court of India held in 1985 that the right to life in the 
Constitution incidentally includes the right to livelihood because this would give 
greater effect and meaning to the parent right, beyond just the idea that life cannot be 
extinguished.189 
At least conceptually, the argument may be made that some general right 
under international law can, in certain contexts, be extended so long as what is 
covered fits within the purpose or object of the parent right. An ancillary or incidental 
right champions the notion of extending a right beyond that which is normally 
understood or formally codified, but which is essential in order to give the right 
effective meaning, especially in an evolving environment. Only those things with a 
sufficient connection to the object of the parent right could justifiably be considered 
ancillary or incidental to it. 
Talking of the use of force and self-defence, Bowett has alluded to the concept 
of incidental and necessary conduct towards the achievement of the primary right. He 
says that: 
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The circumstances in which necessity may excuse the non-
observance of the duties imposed by international law restricting the 
use of force are those in which, as an incidental to the exercise of the 
right of self-defence, the rights of an innocent state are infringed.190  
Such conduct is ‘excusable’ because the act of self-defence against a belligerent may 
require that the rights of an innocent state be harmed, but only to a slight degree when 
compared to the harm that might occasion the other state ‘if denied the right to act out 
of necessity’.191 Although Bowett speaks on the use of force in self-defence, his 
comments might aptly be extended to the necessity surrounding the practice of 
espionage incidental to self-defence. 
An ancillary or incidental right would emerge alongside and be grafted onto 
the parent right, likely taking a similar form.  It may be formally codified in a treaty, 
but where the parent right is a customary one, such as pre-emptive or anticipatory 
self-defence, an ancillary right would emerge in the same manner. This is important 
because to be an interest protected by law, ‘it must be validated within the framework 
of a legal system’.192 This necessarily depends upon the dynamic nature of customary 
international law,193 and would emerge gradually as it takes hold and matures.194 
Nonetheless, an ancillary right would develop just as much of international law does. 
Beginning as a controversial and arguably subversive idea, eventually the roots begin 
to take hold and a norm develops.195 
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(b) Moving From Tolerance to Justification of Peacetime Espionage 
Despite being controversial and provoking counter-argument, a conceptual 
proposition to move from political toleration in international relations to justification 
under international law is not an unrealistically imaginative proposition, and should 
not be too readily discarded as impracticable or an unattainable objective. States 
already largely tolerate espionage at a political level,196 evidenced by Australia’s tepid 
reaction to its discovery of South Korean diplomatic spies in 2011.197 States do so in 
recognition of the utility of espionage for peace, stability and the suppression of 
conflict and terrorism; they understand the importance of information.198  
This is a proposition that does not intrude into the more controversial actual 
use of force under Article 51. It is not treating espionage in this context as a physical 
exercise of self-defence or a means of warfare, as it is treated during wartime. It is 
instead a proposition that would help to determine whether the prohibition on the use 
of force might be lifted in a certain context. It would help states to discern between 
those situations that warrant acts of pre-emptive or anticipatory self-defence and those 
that do not. It would indeed have the potential to minimise the use of force if states 
knew of the danger or lack thereof posed by competing state and non-state actors 
alike. Ultimately, it would arguably lead to a more intelligent self-defence doctrine. 
Of course, in a practical sense, trying to identify actors who would call for a 
transition from political toleration and compromise to the public realm of 
international law would prove difficult. This somewhat reinforces the inherent 
‘academic’ nature of this discussion. 
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3 What Practical and Legal Ramifications Would Flow? 
This argument adopts a pragmatic and realistic perspective towards the issue of 
peacetime espionage. But it is important to consider what legal and practical 
ramifications might arise if such a right or justification were established. 
(a) Practical Ramifications 
This argument carries obvious strategic logic for individual states, but it would also 
be beneficial for international security. As already discussed, advanced information 
helps to avoid serious miscalculations of opposing states’ intentions and unnecessary 
state conflict.199 It also helps to dispel potential acts of terror, which serve to 
destabilise not just the domestic sanctity of a targeted state but potentially also the 
relationship between that targeted state and any state that may have harboured those 
terrorists. The attacks of September 11, 2001 and the resulting invasion of 
Afghanistan are case in point. To the extent that it is possible to avoid destructive 
surprise attacks and unnecessary conflict, Scott suggests that ‘international espionage 
as an instrument of self-defence seems justified’.200  
Espionage might also help to reduce the friction of nuclear rhetoric and 
brinkmanship in situations such as the recent North Korean security escalation,201 
because of the ability to inform rational foreign policy decision-making through 
better-informed evaluations and calculations. This can effectuate international system 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 See, eg, Sulmasy and Yoo, above n 51, 633. 
200 Scott, above n 69, 226. 
201 See Baker, above n 52, 1111. See generally, Kim R Holmes, 'HOLMES: Decoding North Korea's 
nuclear rhetoric', The Wasghinton times (Online), 3 April 2013 
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stability, the object of self-defence and the jus ad bellum architecture. An example of 
such ‘pre-emptive spying’, although not in the form of espionage discussed in this 
paper, is Japan’s 2003 launch of two spy satellites to collect information mostly on 
the developing threat posed by North Korea.202 
By promoting a more intelligent self-defence doctrine, it might assist the 
primary purpose of the Charter of the United Nations in Article 1(1) to maintain 
international peace and security by removing threats and suppressing acts of 
aggression or other threats to international peace and security. Additionally, by better 
informing when the use of force in self-defence is warranted, and by helping discern 
between actual imminent threats and those more infant or far-fetched, justifying 
espionage in this way might indirectly help to bring improved clarity to the blurred 
security environment examined in Part III.  
Admittedly, espionage may be considered a double-edged sword, which has 
the potential to both stabilise international relations by improving rational decision-
making, and to escalate tensions by increasing mistrust and suspicion between states 
when an espionage mission is detected.203 Yet a growing ‘catch-and-release’ policy — 
exemplified by spy exchanges in 1952204 and 2010205 — suggests that a spy’s capture 
will not necessarily destabilise inter-state relations, as states’ tolerance and acceptance 	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203 See generally, Falk, above n 70, 61. 
204 See generally, Jonathan Colby, 'The Developing International Law on Gathering and Sharing 
Security Intelligence' (1974) 1 Yale Studies in World Public Order 49, 86; Monika B Krizek, 'The 
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dyn/content/article/2010/07/09/AR2010070901956.html>; Mary Beth Sheridan and Jerry Markon, 
'U.S., Russia reach deal on exchanging spies', Washington Post (Online), 9 July 2010 
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full media glare', The Guardian (Online), 10 July 2010  
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of spying grows.206 Attempts to seek more amicable solutions to reciprocal espionage 
may also be identified in a receiving state’s treatment of a diplomatic spy as persona 
non grata for violation of diplomatic duties and responsibilities,207 rather than any 
international law or crime.208 One recent example of this watered-down treatment 
came in 2011, when it was discovered that South Korean diplomats in Canberra were 
attempting to cultivate information from Australian public servants. Surprisingly, 
none of the spies were even declared persona non grata. They were all allowed to 
remain in Australia, with legal action sought to protect their identities and prevent 
disclosure of the matter in an effort to maintain good relations with South Korea.209 
Further indicative of reciprocal tolerance of spying are some of the Cold War arms 
control agreements that indicated tolerance of espionage by allowing ‘national 
technical means of verification’ of treaty compliance.210 
Importantly, espionage is already so widely practised by states that the scale of 
spying would not change dramatically, and spies may continue to face domestic 
punishments as a deterrent. Additionally, having peacetime espionage recognized by 
international law in some form might provide an opportunity for more adequate 
treatment or regulation of espionage. Thus, justification of espionage might be 
achieved without a considerably deleterious effect on inter-state relations. 	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(b) Legal Ramifications 
Having states better informed about the nature of the threats they face under a more 
intelligent self-defence doctrine would help to reduce the unwarranted and illegal 
resort to force. However, because self-defence is an exception to the prohibition on 
the use of force and non-intervention, the legal effect of an ancillary right would 
therefore also be to justify the violation of non-intervention that is inherent within 
peacetime espionage. This may lead to an abuse of the norm of non-intervention and 
sovereignty on false pretexts about intelligence gathering for the purposes of self-
defence. 
Importantly, espionage for extraneous purposes would fall outside the scope of 
the ancillary right. Admittedly, this may be a particularly hard line to draw and may 
be bent and stretched by states, creating nebulous boundaries for the legality of 
peacetime espionage. However, this proposition raises the possibility of an ancillary 
right or justification amounting to a defence in the ICJ to a claim of espionage by a 
violated state, as well as the potential to justify acts of self-defence reported to the 
Security Council by providing relevant evidence of any threats or attacks faced. 
Importantly, by taking peacetime espionage somewhat out of the shadows of 
international law it still remains ‘espionage’. The act is still contrary and subject to 
the domestic laws of a violated state, and remains deceitful and clandestine.  This 
argument does not redefine that basic element of the act.  Instead, what might be open 
to reconsideration are the traditional understandings and definitions that conceive of 
espionage as a purely state-to-state act, given its variable targets today. If anything, 
this highlights that we need to think about the practice of espionage in new ways. 
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Debating a right or justification of peacetime espionage would ineluctably 
raise questions of immunity for captured spies. What would be the legal implications 
for the status and treatment of captured spies if their act were justified under 
international law? If peacetime spying is a fundamental part of upholding the 
important law of self-defence, should spies, acting on the order of their state, be 
afforded some sort of international status, immunity or protection for the violation of 
domestic crimes?  
However, immunity rests on mutual interests and a relative bargain being 
struck.  For example, diplomatic immunity is reciprocally acknowledged because it is 
of mutual interest to all states to do so.211 Not all states have mutual interests in 
espionage because not all states engage in it at comparable degrees. Any protections 
would more likely operate on a bilateral or multilateral level between a handful of 
practising states, rather than be universally applied. In any case, this does raise new 
avenues of discussion for the treatment of captured spies. 
As already argued, international law might also receive greater legitimacy as a 
system of rules claiming to regulate international relations if it is able to finally 
contemplate a practice so widespread and so vital to international security. Of course, 
inevitably questions arise concerning what we should seek or expect from 
international law as a body of law, how comprehensively it should contemplate every 
practice of states, or whether it should work in complement with other bodies of law. 
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V  A WAY FORWARD? 
Espionage presents a challenge like no other in international law. How does 
international law develop around espionage when no state wants to officially address 
it? How do we begin to talk about law or start to think about law when that is the 
case? This is an especially difficult task given that competing national interests and 
power asymmetries between states will inevitably distort and hinder the creation of 
security norms around espionage.212 Further, finding parties who would actually 
campaign for this development in the law regarding peacetime espionage would prove 
problematic.  
If nothing else, this paper advocates for the start of a conversation, albeit an 
inherently academic one. Despite the difficulties and assumptions in this argument, it 
is useful to continue the conversation about espionage and to begin to think of its role 
and position in international law and security in new ways, especially given the 
paucity of modern literature. 
Given states are unlikely to proscribe espionage, as it is not in their national-
interest to do so, if international law is to better handle peacetime espionage then, 
conceptually, the only direction it could head in is one that leads to legitimizing or 
justifying its practice, even in a limited way, and builds from there. Indeed, promoting 
a discourse around the possibility that international law might contemplate peacetime 
espionage as argued may provide an eventual opportunity for better oversight and 
further attention. 
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A An International Treaty 
A treaty or convention recognising this ancillary right would be most useful for 
building the credibility and certainty of the law, but this would be the most difficult 
and unrealistic means of bridging the gap in international law’s treatment of 
peacetime espionage. Whilst more beneficial in the long-term, a treaty would take 
years to negotiate and materialise.213  One unlikely possibility is to redraft Article 51 
to include an ancillary right to conduct espionage. Arguably, before such an 
amendment could occur, Article 51 would need to be redrafted to explicitly sanction 
pre-emptive and anticipatory self-defence. Indeed, it is ambitious to suggest a treaty 
or convention would be successfully created regulating what may or may not be spied 
upon or the circumstances that justify peacetime spying. States are unlikely to ever 
authoritatively permit or proscribe the practice of espionage because of the non-
reflexive manner in which they approach it;214 all states have an interest in spying, but 
equally they have an interest in preventing being spied upon. As Forcese has 
highlighted, it is ‘doubtful that espionage in another nation’s territory will ever be 
explicitly acknowledged as ‘legal’ under the law of nations’.215  
Notwithstanding the inherent difficulties in trying to construct a treaty, more 
needs to be done to understand and flesh out a state’s right to pre-emptively and 
anticipatorily defend itself, and a continuing discussion on peacetime espionage 
would certainly help to build that understanding. 
 Indeed, a more threadbare treaty framework might better allow cardinal norms 
of international law to adapt to changing circumstances, in the way that the right of 
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self-defence has evolved over time, and so perhaps the absence of treaty regulation of 
espionage is preferable. 
B Recommendatory Guidelines 
There is utility in drafting aspirational guidelines or codes of conduct, espousing the 
‘rules of the game’. Such guidelines might define the outer limits of justifiable 
espionage, providing guidance as to the parameters of legal behaviour in identifying 
and measuring threats. They might provide that, for the benefit of international 
stability and inter-state relations, espionage for purposes not incidental or sufficiently 
connected to the exercise of the right of self-defence should not be carried out. It may 
prove quite difficult to set exemplary guidelines of those purposes or targets of 
espionage that would fall incidental and those which do not, and would ultimately 
rely on discretion of the state. But the difficulty in framing acceptable conduct in the 
law should never dissuade attempts to do so. It may be desirable to commission a 
panel of experts to draft such guidelines, to eliminate the appearance of national 
interests infiltrating the drafting process. This would be a more achievable approach, 
though it may be considered less authoritative if states were not involved in their 
production.  
‘Necessity’ and ‘proportionality’ are possible elements for any aspirational or 
recommendatory guidelines. Guidelines might consider whether the act of espionage 
is necessary to effectuate the lawful invocation of the right of self-defence. To this 
end, they might provide recommendatory proscriptions against the conduct of 
espionage directed towards things other than the operation of self-defence. They 
might also promote proportionality in scale and the means used to conduct espionage. 
For example, they might stipulate that spies must avoid certain means of collecting 
LAW HONOURS   IAN H MACK 
	   52	  
information including the employment of torture, murder and other crimes that begin 
to test the proportionality of espionage as a legitimate measure incidental to self-
defence. Intelligence acquisition might begin to incur international opprobrium where 
it unacceptably harms innocent bystanders.216 Guidelines might also promote self-
restraint from states in the interests of building inter-state confidence. 217 They could 
help to develop, in due time, a customary law right by influencing state practice, 
opinio juris and international legal opinion and doctrine around espionage and self-
defence. 
Lessons may be drawn from other grey zone developments in the last decade, 
such as those relating to private military contractors. The 2008 Montreux Document 
on Private Military and Security Contractors 218 recommends good state practice 
relating to the verification and oversight of private military and security companies. It 
is aimed at promoting respect for international humanitarian law and human rights 
law and is not legally binding. With 44 states currently supporting the Montreux 
Document, it highlights that such a recommendatory framework is indeed possible in 
international law.  
There might alternatively develop a set of flexible frameworks or steps of 
conflict resolution suggesting how states could go about negotiating through the 
potentially disruptive event of a spy’s capture. If there were an understanding of 
whether, or under what circumstances, espionage is legal or justified then violated 
states may be guided as how to respond when they uncover an intelligence operation. 	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For example, whether they are able to prosecute or just expel the spy, and whether 
they might take the offending state to the ICJ for reparations and apologies.  Such 
frameworks might help to discourage violated states from responding aggressively 
through the use of force or declarations of war. 
C Customary Law 
A consequence of more concerted academic discussion may also be to influence 
customary law because it can potentially trigger the emergence of state practice and 
opinio juris. Indeed, such dialogue may help to produce norms around peacetime 
espionage that would exist as ‘guiding posts for state behaviour’ that become 
‘embedded in the belief systems of policy-makers, thus influencing state 
behaviour’.219 Such norms might have the potential to develop into legal principles.220 
Accordingly, customary law may potentially develop in this direction.  
Accepting anticipatory and pre-emptive self-defence as lawful under 
customary international law, a pragmatic prescription may be to encourage customary 
international law to gradually build a justification for peacetime espionage as a 
mutation alongside these parent rights. Customary law is perfectly suited to address 
security contexts that do not fit within the Hague and Geneva frameworks,221 filling 
the gap where treaties fail.222 However, the development of a customary law right 
would inevitably face difficulties given that state practice and opinio juris currently 
run in opposite directions. Indeed, Forcese notes that there is ‘little doctrinal support 
for a “customary” defence of peacetime espionage in international law’. 223 
Nonetheless, despite the shortcomings in such an argument and the fact it may not be 	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tenable at this point in time, this could be a direction in which international law be 
encouraged to develop. 
VI CONCLUSION 
International law currently only contemplates espionage within jus in bello in times of 
war.  This paper has demonstrated the need and opportunity for its recognition in 
times of peace, positioning it within the framework of jus ad bellum and under the 
extended rubric of self-defence. Under this framework, international law is able to 
begin to account for peacetime espionage where it has not done so before, building 
greater legal certainty around its practice. It may still be deemed a violation of non-
intervention. However, an ancillary right to the right of self-defence justifies this 
violation when espionage is carried out with the object of informing the necessary and 
proportionate exercise of the right of self-defence. This is a workable prescription that 
promotes the rule of law and maintains the legitimacy of international law as a 
regulator of international relations, something that it arguably lacks when it ignores 
such a widespread tool of statecraft. With this more comprehensive recognition of the 
entire practice of espionage, there is the possibility for the development of some form 
of regulatory or recommendatory framework to govern peacetime espionage.  It also 
opens up the possibility to develop academic discussion, law and practice around state 
responsibility and the treatment of captured spies. 
There is utility in this academic process as it may lead to a more intelligent 
self-defence doctrine, helping to clarify issues relating to lawful pre-emptive and 
anticipatory self-defence measures. The right of self-defence is such a crucial power 
in international law, security and order.  It should be fleshed out as much as possible 
so it may be better understood and be practised in more legitimate and lawful ways. 
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The ability to develop a more intelligent doctrine of self-defence arguably supports 
building international law’s contemplation of peacetime espionage in the way 
outlined. 
In a more general way, this discussion highlights a need to continue to think 
about the place espionage inhabits in international law and international relations in 
new ways.  There are a multitude of questions that cannot be answered here which 
would ineluctably follow a proposition justifying acts of peacetime espionage, most 
importantly those relating to the status and treatment of captured spies. There are also 
diverse modes of intelligence collection like cyber espionage that fall outside of the 
narrow conception adopted in this paper, but which inevitably colour a broader 
discussion. Other questions not dealt with here include whether states carrying out 
intelligence-gathering missions for humanitarian purposes should incur international 
liability for doing so, or how their agents should be treated. Further exploration into 
the practice of espionage incidental to humanitarian intervention would be a useful 
academic endeavour. This general discussion also raises broad questions around what 
we should seek from international law as a regulator of international relations, and 
whether it should step in and contemplate realities which at the international level 
have so far only been dealt with politically. But what is apparent is that the evolution 
in the security environment, and the place of intelligence gathering within it, 
highlights a need to develop new perspectives and ultimately a greater synthesis 
between espionage, international law, international relations and the modern security 
environment. 
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